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ABSTRACT
Controversy, disagreement, conflict, polarization and opinion di-
vergence in social networks have been the subject of much recent
research. In particular, researchers have addressed the question of
how such concepts can be quantified given people’s prior opinions,
and how they can be optimized by influencing the opinion of a
small number of people or by editing the network’s connectivity.
Here, rather than optimizing such concepts given a specific set
of prior opinions, we study whether they can be optimized in the
average case and in the worst case over all sets of prior opinions.
In particular, we derive the worst-case and average-case conflict
risk of networks, and we propose algorithms for optimizing these.
For somemeasures of conflict, these are non-convex optimization
problems with many local minima. We provide a theoretical and
empirical analysis of the nature of some of these local minima, and
show how they are related to existing organizational structures.
Empirical results show how a small number of edits quickly
decreases its conflict risk, both average-case and worst-case. Fur-
thermore, it shows that minimizing average-case conflict risk often
does not reduce worst-case conflict risk. Minimizing worst-case
conflict risk on the other hand, while computationally more chal-
lenging, is generally effective at minimizing both worst-case as well
as average-case conflict risk.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The study of how opinions form through social interactions with
others with potentially differing opinions has long been studied in
the social sciences (see e.g. [11, 14]). Today, online social networks
offer unprecedented access to both social interactions and publicly
expressed opinions on controversial matters. This now allows one
to quantitatively study differences of opinions on a large scale,
as well as to moderate them through targeted interventions. This
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newfound ability offers new opportunities for conflict prevention
and mitigation, as well as for more effective marketing campaigns.1
Background. Much prior research has focused on opinions on
political matters [1, 9, 27]. However, recent work has often studied
the problem in a more generic manner (independent of the topic of
controversy) [21, 25, 30]. The identification of controversial issues
has been studied using tools from sentiment analysis [7, 26], as
well as by relying on the structure of the social network and the
distribution of opinions across it [1, 3, 8, 9]. Besides identifying or
quantifying controversy or conflict, the question of how it can be
influenced has received increasing amounts of attention [17, 25, 28].
Strategies that have been considered include editing the graph (or
even designing it from scratch), and attempting to alter the opinions
of a small number of individuals [6, 16, 19, 25, 28].
Most of these results are based on the opinion formation model
by Friedkin and Johnsen [14], which extended DeGroot’s model
of opinion averaging [11]. In Friedkin and Johnsen’s model, indi-
viduals are assumed to hold an (‘a priori’) internal opinion, while
they may express an opinion that may differ from it but that is more
socially acceptable (i.e. more similar to their friends’ opinions). To
model this, it is assumed that individuals are connected to each
other in a social network, and that individuals’ expressed opinion
is a weighted average of their own internal opinion and their neigh-
bors’ expressed opinions, with weights representing the strength
of the connections in the network.
Shortcomings in the state-of-the-art. An important problem
with Friedkin and Johnsen’s model is that, while external opinions
are hard to measure, access to internal opinions is near-impossible
in practice. Another shortcoming of the dominant line of research
attempting to reduce conflict by editing the social network is that
it tends to focus on a single or a given set of controversial topics.
Yet, different issues do not generally correspond to different social
networks, such that editing a social network to minimize conflict
on one issue may actually increase conflict on another.
Contributions in this paper. In this paper, we depart from the
existing literature in focusing on risk of conflict, rather than on
conflict around one particular issue. In this way, we overcome both
shortcomings of prior work discussed above. We still rely on Fried-
kin and Johnsen’s model of opinion formation to quantify the risk of
networks to conflict (which we discuss in detail in Sec. 2). However,
the proposed quantifications are independent of any particular set
of internal (or external) opinions, depending purely on the topology
of the network. In this way, we bypass the problem that quantifying
internal opinions is beyond reach in practice. Moreover, attempting
to reduce the risk of conflict, leads to more robust network editing
1It also creates risks: it could allow oppressive governments to design more effective
propaganda, or hostile actors to incite conflict rather than prevent it. These risks are
an additional reason for these matters to be studied by the scientific community.
strategies than reducing conflict for one particular assignment of
internal opinions.
More specifically, we propose two measures of conflict risk: the
worst-case conflict risk (WCR) and the average-case conflict risk
(ACR), respectively quantifying the amount of conflict in the worst-
case, and on average, over all possible internal opinions. Subse-
quently, we demonstrate how both WCR and ACR can be mini-
mized by locally editing the network. We do this for a number
of pre-existing measures of conflict and disagreement discussed
in Sec. 3, most notably the internal conflict (the extent to which
individuals are torn by expressing an opinion that differs from their
internal opinion), external conflict (the extent to which neighboring
individuals express different opinions), and controversy (the overall
variation in expressed opinion). A side-result in this paper is an
equality relating these different conflict measures, leading to what
we refer as a conservation law of conflict: the sum of the internal
conflict, twice the external conflict, and controversy is a constant.
In Sec. 4 we propose two types of algorithms (one coordinate
descent, and one conditional gradient descent) to locally edit the
social network to reduce the WCR and ACR for a number of these
measures of conflict. Empirical results are provided in Sec. 5, evalu-
ating the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms at reducing risk
of conflict, providing additional insight into the local minima of the
measures, and discussing conflict risk in random network models.
We end with related work in Sec. 6 and conclusions in Sec. 7.
Notation. Let G = (V ,E,w) be an undirected positive-weighted
network with V = {1, . . . ,n} the set of nodes, E ∈ V × V the set
of m = |E | edges (with (i, j) ∈ E iff (j, i) ∈ E), and w a weight
function mapping an edge e ∈ E onto its weight w(e) > 0. We
denote with A the (symmetric) adjacency matrix (with zero di-
agonal), defined by ai j = w (i, j) iff (i, j) ∈ E and ai j = 0 other-
wise. With N (i) we denote the set of neighboring nodes of node i:
N (i) ≜ {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E}. Let 1 denote the vector of ones of appro-
priate size. Furthermore, let d ≜ A1 denote the vector containing
the weighted degrees of all nodes, and D ≜ diag(d) the diagonal
degree matrix. Then the Laplacian matrix is defined as L ≜ D − A.
2 OPINION FORMATION MODELS
Here we briefly discuss the models of opinion formation on social
networks, as formalized above, related to the present paper.
The dynamicmodel.According to DeGroot’s model [11], people’s
opinions are updated gradually through repeated communication.
In the model, every person i ∈ V has an opinion si (t) at time t , and
it is influenced by its direct neighbors so as to evolve into a different
opinion si (t + 1) in the next time step. More precisely, their opinion
is updated as the weighted sum of their own opinion (with weight
wii ) and those of the neighbors (with weight wi j for neighbor j).
Given a weighted graphG = (V ,E,w), and the opinions si (t) of the
nodes at time t , the updating rule is defined as:
si (t + 1) =
wiisi (t) +∑j ∈N (i)wi jsj (t)
wii +
∑
j ∈N (i)wi j
(1)
This model formalizes opinion formation as a repeated averaging
process of one’s opinion with one’s neighbors.
The static model. In 1990, Friedkin and Johnsen extended the
model by DeGroot to have two different kinds of opinions [14]:
Table 1: Measures for conflict in undirected networks
Name z s
internal conflict: ic zT L2z sT (L + I)−1 L2 (L + I)−1 s
external conflict: ec zT Lz sT (L + I)−1 L (L + I)−1 s
controversy: c zT z sT (L + I)−2 s
resistance: r zT s sT (L + I)−1 s
an internal opinion si and an expressed opinion zi . The internal
opinions of every person are assumed fixed, while the expressed
opinions are influenced by the node’s own internal opinion as well
the expressed opinions of the neighbors, as follows:
zi =
wiisi +
∑
j ∈N (i)wi jzj
wii +
∑
j ∈N (i)wi j
. (2)
Expressed in matrix-vector notation, and withwii = 1 (a common
assumption in the literature that we also make in this paper), this
equation is solved by (3) below at equilibrium [6]:
z = (L + I)−1 s. (3)
In this model, the internal opinion si of node i is considered
a constant, and private to each individual, while the expressed
opinion zi is public, and a compromise between the internal opinion
of node i and the expressed opinion of node i’s neighbors.
Remark 1. In this paper, we will generally assume that the internal
opinions are mean-centered. Note that in that case, also zwill be mean-
centered. As opinions are arguably relative, this assumption should
not incur any loss of generality. Rather on the contrary: some measures
of opinions are affected by the mean of s (as we will point out later),
which is arguably undesirable, such that assuming s has zero mean
enhances the usability of the proposed measures.
3 CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RISK
In this paper, we rely on Friedkin and Johnsen’s model of opinion
formation and discuss a number of (previously known) measures of
conflict in terms of the internal opinions s and expressed opinions
z = (L + I)−1s. Note that we will often use the term conflict in a
more generic manner in this paper, to signify conflict, controversy,
or disagreement more generally.
In Sec. 3.1 we survey the measures of conflict and discuss how
they can be computed using matrix-vector operations. Section 3.2
introduces an intriguing though intuitive connection between some
of these measures. Finally, in Sec. 3.3 we discuss how the risk of
conflict, as quantified by the proposed measures, can be formulated,
both in the worst case (WCR) and in the average-case (ACR).
3.1 Conflict Measures
Table 1 provides an overview of the proposed measures, which we
will discuss in greater detail below.
Internal Conflict ic. The internal conflict measure is designed to
quantify the extent to which individuals’ internal and expressed
opinions differ.
Definition 3.1. The internal conflict ic is the sum of squares of
the differences between individual internal and expressed opinions:
ic =
∑
i
(zi − si )2 .
The following proposition provides a convenient matrix-vector
expression for it. The proof is elementary and omitted for brevity.
Proposition 3.2. ic = zT L2z = sT (L + I)−1L2(L + I)−1s.
External Conflict ec.Arguably the most relevant measure in prac-
tice, the external conflict measure quantifies the extent to which
the expressed opinions of neighbors are in disagreement with each
other. Formally:
Definition 3.3. The external conflict ec is the weighted sum of
squares of the pairwise differences between the expressed opinions
of neighbors in the network:
ec =
∑
(i, j)∈E
wi j
(
zi − zj
)2
.
Again, it can be expressed conveniently in matrix-vector form:
Proposition 3.4. ec = zT Lz = sT (L + I)−1 L (L + I)−1 s.
The proposed measure of external conflict is closely related to
the so-called Network Disagreement Index (NDI) in [10], except
that there are two different opinions in our work: it is equal to the
NDI evaluated on the external opinions.
Controversy c. Given the expressed opinions, the controversy
does not depend on the network structure, and simply quantifies
how much the opinion varies across the individuals in the network:
Definition 3.5. The controversy c is the sum of the squares of the
expressed opinions:
c =
∑
i
z2i .
Again, this can be trivially expressed in matrix-vector form:
Proposition 3.6. c = zT z = sT (L + I)−2 s.
The controversy c is equivalent with the polarization index pro-
posed by Matakos et al. [25], although they normalized the measure
by n, the number of nodes in the network. For zero mean s (and
hence zero mean z), as we assume in this paper, the controversy is
also equivalent to the Global Disagreement Index [10], defined as:
γ (x) :=
∑
i<j
(
xi − x j
)2 (4)
More specifically, the GDI is a constant factor n times larger than
the controversy.
Resistance r . The final measure we wish to discuss is the resis-
tance.2
2 Its suggested name stems from its mathematical form, which is closely related
to the effective resistance in graphs [12]: Ri j =
(
ei − ej
)T L+ (ei − ej ) , thus it is
called resistance. In a graph, the effective resistance between two nodes i and j is:(
ei − ej
)T L+ (ei − ej ) . ei has one at position i and zeros elsewhere. If s = ei − ej
where only the opinions of the two nodes count,
r = sT (L + I)−1 s = (ei − ej )T (L + I)−1 (ei − ej ) .
Definition 3.7. The resistance r is the inner product between
expressed and internal opinion vectors:
r =
∑
i
sizi .
It can again be expressed in matrix-vector notation:
Proposition 3.8. r = sT z = sT (L + I)−1s.
The resistance was in fact introduced earlier by Musco et al. [28]
(where it was given no name). It was introduced there as the sum
of the controversy and external conflict:
Proposition 3.9. Resistance is the sum of external conflict and
controversy: r = ec + c .
Their work included an algorithm for optimizing the network to
reduce conflict given a specified internal opinion vector s, and took
advantage of the fact that resistance is matrix-convex in L.
Summary. Thus, each of the measures can be written in the form
∗ = sTM∗s,
where ∗ is one of ic , ec , c , or r , and Mic = (L + I)−1L2(L + I)−1,
Mec = (L + I)−1L(L + I)−1,Mc = (L + I)−2, andMr = (L + I)−1.
We note in passing that the matrices L and (L+ I) obviously have
the same eigenspaces, such that they commute – i.e. the factors in
the expressions forM∗ can be freely rearranged.
3.2 A conservation law of conflict
In this section, we state an identity that implies that the different
measures of conflict act like communicating vessels: reducing one
implies that another one must be increased.
Theorem 3.10 (Conservation law of conflict). Given a net-
work and an internal opinion vector s, then the sum of ic , 2ec , and c
is a constant equal to sT s:
ic + 2ec + c = sT s.
Proof. ic + 2ec + c = sT (L + I)−1 (L2 + 2L + I) (L + I)−1 s =
sT (L + I)−1(L + I)2(L + I)−1s = sT s. □
Note that the constant sT s could be regarded as the internal
controversy: the inherent controversy on a particular topic. The
conservation law essentially states that in a social network, this in-
herent controversy is divided over external conflict, internal conflict,
and a remaining amount of controversy. The relative proportions
of each of these measures of conflict depend on the structure of the
network in relation to the internal opinion vector s.
To understand this better, let L = UΛUT be the eigenvalue de-
composition of L. It is known from graph signal processing [31] that
eigenvectors corresponding to small eigenvalues are slowly varying
over the graph (i.e. the i’th and j’th entries of such an eigenvalue
tend to be similar if i and j are nearby in the graph), while the large
eigenvalues correspond to eigenvectors that fluctuate rapidly over
the graph. The eigenvalue decompositions of the diagonal matrices
with eigenvaluesM∗ are then given by:
Mic = UΛ2(Λ+I)−2UT , Mec = UΛ(Λ+I)−2UT , Mc = U(Λ+I)−2UT .
Figure 1: Eigenvalues in the Conservation Law.
In other words, any eigenvalue λ of the Laplacian L yields a corre-
sponding eigenvalue of theM∗ matrices as follows:
λic =
λ2
(λ + 1)2 , λec =
λ
(λ + 1)2 , λc =
1
(λ + 1)2 .
These eigenvalues are plotted as a function of the eigenvalue λ of
the Laplacian in Fig. 1.3
Note that λc increases with λ, λic decreases with λ, and λec first
increases to reach a maximum value of 0.25 at λ = 1 after which it
decreases again.
For a fixed 2-norm of the internal opinion vector s, themeasure of
conflict withM∗ is larger themore it is alignedwith the eigenvectors
corresponding to the largest eigenvalues ofM∗. Figure 1 shows that
this differs for the different measures.
For s aligning with the smoothest eigenvectors of the Laplacian
(i.e. those corresponding to small eigenvalues λ of the Laplacian),
the internal and external conflicts are small, but the controversy is
large as internal opinions remain unmoderated by dissenting neigh-
bors. This situation would arise when the graph contains different
(nearly) disconnected communities, and within each community
the internal opinion is constant, while between the communities
the internal opinions differ. As s becomes more aligned with less
smooth eigenvectors (i.e. with larger eigenvalues), the external
conflict starts to increase because conflicts between neighbors are
starting to arise. For the same reason, the internal conflict starts
to increase, and the controversy starts to decrease. The external
conflict reaches its maximum when s is aligned with eigenvectors
of L with eigenvalue λ ≈ 1. As λ keeps increasing, meaning s aligns
with more high-frequency eigenvectors, the moderating effect of
neighbors starts to become more important, resulting in a decrease
of external conflict as well as the controversy. Essentially, the con-
flict is increasingly internalized in a network where neighbors often
have different internal opinions.
3 Note that the conservation law is reflected in this figure in the following equality, as
can be visually verified from Fig. 1: λic + 2λec + λc = 1.
3.3 Conflict Risk of a Network
The measures from Sec. 3.1 quantify the various types of conflict
given an internal opinion vector s. Prior work (see Sec. 6) has
focused on tweaking the network or the opinions of a selection of
individuals to reduce such measures. Often, however, the internal
opinions are not accessible. More fundamentally, one might wish
to minimize conflict on more than one, including yet unknown
controversial issues. We therefore argue that it is more sensible to
engineer a network so as to reduce the risk of conflict, rather than
the conflict for one specific internal opinion vector s. We propose
two ways of quantifying risk of conflict, discussed in turn below.
Average-case Conflict Risk (ACR). The ACR is defined as the
expected conflict, where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the internal
opinions. To evaluate this, a probabilistic model for the internal
opinions is needed, and we propose to use the uniform distribution
over all vectors from {−1, 1}n , such that E [ssT ] = I. Thus:
ACR∗ = E
[
sTM∗s
]
= E
[
Tr
(
ssTM∗
)]
= Tr
(
E
[
ssT
]
M∗
)
,
= Tr(M∗).
Worst-case Conflict Risk (WCR). This is an alternative (and
more robust) measure, defined as the maximum conflict over all
possible internal opinion vectors s ∈ {−1, 1}n :
WCR∗ = max
s∈{−1,1}n
sTM∗s.
Note thatM∗ ⪰ 0 for all measures, such that this is an instance of
Boolean Quadratic Maximization (BQM) problem [24, 29]. While
this problem is NP-hard, it can be approximated by solving the fol-
lowing semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation of the problem
(here, Σ is a symmetric real-valued matrix):
u∗ = max
Σ
Tr(ΣM∗),
s.t. Σ ⪰ 0,
diag(Σ) = 1.
Nesterov [29] proved that this strategy achieves a 2π approximation:
2
π
u∗ ≤ WCR∗ ≤ u∗.
To derive an estimate for the worst-case s ∈ {−1, 1}n from Σ,
Goemans and Williamson’s randomized rounding strategy [20] can
be used: Let Σ = CCT be a Cholesky decomposition of Σ, and
let x ∈ Rn be a randomly sampled vector from some rotation-
invariant distribution. Then, for s = sign(Cx), it holds that (where
the expectation is over the random vector x):
2
π
WCR∗ ≤ E[sTM∗s] ≤ WCR∗.
I.e., the estimated worst-case opinion vector achieves a conflict that
is not smaller than 2π the actual worst-case conflict.
SDPs can be solved in polynomial time:O(n4.5). While this is still
a high complexity, in practice such SDPs can be solved without fur-
ther optimizations for thousands of nodes on commodity machines,
and results for the Maximum Cut problem suggest that scaling
is possible much beyond that (to millions of nodes) by exploiting
tight approximations, further relaxations, or dedicated optimization
approaches [5, 32].
4 MINIMIZING THE CONFLICT RISK
4.1 Algorithms
Here we discuss how the ACR andWCR can be optimized by adding
or deleting edges in the network. Note that only the resistance is
known to be convex, such that we should not hope for convergence
to a global optimum. Yet, we argue that the question of convexity is
purely academic here: in practice, graph edits can typically be made
only in small amounts, either because of budget constraints, or
because of practical considerations. For example, a company may
wish to increase its productivity by organizing a team-building
event or reorganizing office space so as to create new conflict-risk
reducing connections, but such operations are costly and cannot
in practice redesign the complete network structure. Thus, what
we should be interested in is a fast decrease of the ACR or WCR
given the number of edges added or deleted, rather than eventual
convergence to a possible local minimum – let alone a global one.
The edits we consider are edge additions or deletions, or more
precisely the increase or decrease of edge weights as long as they
remain in the range [0, 1]. We keep them within this range because
it makes no sense to talk about a negative edge strength in social
networks, and there is a bound on the strength of connections. Our
algorithms can easily be adapted to handle different bounds.
Below, we discuss two algorithmic approaches to this end: one
is a conditional gradient method, and suggests a number of edge
additions or deletions simultaneously. The other is a coordinate
descent method, and suggests adding or deleting just a single edge.
The optimization problems. Let A0 be the initial adjacency ma-
trix, and A the optimized adjacency matrix with corresponding
matrixM∗. With ∥·∥1 the entry-wise one-norm, the optimization
problems for ACR and WCR are thus:
ACR: min
A
Tr(M∗),
s.t. 0 ≤ A ≤ 1, and ∥A − A0∥1 ≤ 2k .
WCR: min
A
max
s∈{−1,1}n
sTM∗s,
s.t. 0 ≤ A ≤ 1, and ∥A − A0∥1 ≤ 2k,
where k is a bound on the sum of absolute values of weight changes
(the factor 2 stems from the fact that A is symmetric). The entry-
wise one-norm on A−A0 ensures this difference tends to be sparse,
such that only few edge weights tend to be updated at the minimum.
For the WCR, this problem is complicated by the inner maxi-
mization. We handle this optimization problem by alternating opti-
mization: before each conditional gradient or coordinate descent
step, we solve the inner maximization as detailed in the previous
section, and then assume s to be fixed. We found however, that
robustness of this strategy can be increased by using not a single s,
but a small set of ℓ vectors s all obtained by randomized rounding.
More specifically, written in terms of S ∈ {−1, 1}n×ℓ containing
these different s vectors as its columns, we solve:
Robust WCR: min
A
Tr(STM∗S),
s.t. 0 ≤ A ≤ 1, and ∥A − A0∥1 ≤ 2k .
Thus, rather than minimizing the risk of conflict for one given
worst-case opinion vector, the average over a set of approximately
worst-case opinion vectors is minimized. The added robustness
of this strategy stems from the fact that different approximately
worst-case opinion vectors can be similarly bad, such that editing
the graph to reduce risk for one can increase risk for another. In
this case, the alternating minimization would fail. Minimizing the
risk averaged over a set approximately worst-case opinion vectors
thus increases robustness. Note that for S = I, the WCR reduces to
the ACR. Thus, it suffices to discuss the optimization of the WCR
in what follows. Both conditional gradient and coordinate descent
first compute the gradient of the ACR and WCR. The gradients for
the different measures are summarized in Table 2.
Conditional gradient descent [13, 23]. The conditional gradient
method seeks a step∆most aligned with the gradient, while respect-
ing the constraints after taking a finite step along that direction.
More specifically, this step direction is found by solving:
min
∆
Tr
©­­«
∂Tr
(
STM∗S
)
∂L
· (diag(∆1) − ∆)ª®®¬ ,
s.t. 0 ≤ A + ∆ ≤ 1, and ∥∆∥1 ≤ 2k ′,
where k ′ << k limits the step size. Here, the objective computes the
inner product between the gradient with respect to L and diag(∆1)−
∆, as changing A by adding ∆ amounts to a step of diag(∆1)−∆ on
the Laplacian. Note again that these constraints induce sparsity in
the solution vector. The experiments indeed confirmed that often
∆ contains exactly 2k ′ 1’s or -1’s.
Coordinate descent. The coordinate descent method first com-
putes the gradient with respect to the (symmetric) adjacency matrix
from the gradient with respect to the Laplacian (as listed in Table 2):
∂Tr
(
STM∗S
)
∂ai j
=
∂Tr
(
STM∗S
)
∂lii
+
∂Tr
(
STM∗S
)
∂lj j
− 2
∂Tr
(
STM∗S
)
∂li j
.
Positive ∂Tr(STM∗S)∂ai j means that reducing ai j > 0 will reduce the
objective. Conversely, negative ∂Tr(STM∗S)∂ai j means that increasing
ai j < 1 will reduce the objective. Thus, the algorithm takes the
∂Tr(STM∗S)
∂ai j
with largest absolute value for which either ai j > 0
and ∂Tr(STM∗S)∂ai j > 0, or for which ai j < 1 and
∂Tr(STM∗S)
∂ai j
< 0. In
the former case, the algorithm sets ai j = aji = 0, and in the latter
it sets ai j = aji = 1.
Conditional gradient versus coordinate descent. The coordi-
nate descent method is computationally obviously easier, but con-
vergence may be slower than with the conditional gradient method.
They are compared with each other in the empirical results section.
4.2 Local optima of the ACR for different risk
measures
As pointed out, only the resistance is known to be convex, such
that the ACR and WCR are prone to local minima. Relying on the
gradients in Table 2, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The complete graph forms local minimum for
the ACR of conflict measures ec , c , and r .
Table 2: Middle Matrices and Gradients
∗ M∗ ACR: ∂Tr(M∗)∂L WCR:
∂Tr(STM∗S)
∂L
ic (L + I)−2 L2 2 (L + I)−2 − 2 (L + I)−3 L(L + I)−2SST (L + I)−1
+(L + I)−1SST (L + I)−2L
ec (L + I)−2 L − (L + I)−2 + 2 (L + I)−3 (L + I)−2SST (L + I)−2
−L(L + I)−2SST (L + I)−2L
c (L + I)−2 −2 (L + I)−3 −(L + I)−1SST (L + I)−2
−(L + I)−2SST (L + I)−1
r (L + I)−1 − (L + I)−2 −(L + I)−1SST (L + I)−1
Table 3: Gradient matrix elements for size n complete graph
Matrix Diagonal Off-diagonal
− (L + I)−2 − n+3(n+1)2 −
n+2
(n+1)2
−2 (L + I)−3 −2n2+3n+4(n+1)3 −2
n2+3n+3
(n+1)3
− (L + I)−2 + 2 (L + I)−3 n2+2n+5(n+1)3
n2+3n+4
(n+1)3
Table 4: Risks for complete graph of size n
∗ ic ec c r
Tr (M∗) n
2(n−1)
(n+1)2
n(n−1)
(n+1)2
n(n+3)
(n+1)2
2n
n+1
Proof. The adjacency matrix of a size n complete graph consists
of 0 on the diagonal and 1 elsewhere, thus the corresponding Lapla-
cian matrix has n − 1 on the diagonal and −1 elsewhere. In Table 3,
the elements in the corresponding ACR gradients with respect to
the Laplacian are shown. We will show from these that no feasible
step can be found that improves the objectives for a complete graph.
Indeed, for a complete graph (with all weights equal to 1), edge
weights can only be decreased. However, decreasing the weight of
the edges increases the objective: for a step of −δ on wi j , the ex-
ternal conflict is increased by 2 n−1(n+1)3 δ , the controversy by
4
(n+1)3 δ
and the resistance by 2(n+1)2 δ . For n > 1 these changes are strictly
positive, such that the ACR would be increased after decreasing
anywi j by 1 ≥ δ > 0. □
Derivative results. A number of results immediately follow from
this proposition. Recall that resistance is convex on L [28], so this
local minimum is a global one. Furthermore, note that from the
conservation law, it follows directly that the gradient of ic+2ec+c is
equal to 0. Thus, it is trivial to show that for ic , a complete graph is
a local maximum of the ACR. Finally, for a complete graph of size n
(i.e., the number of node is n, n > 1), the values of ACR for different
conflict measures are given in Table 4. Using this table, it can be
shown that larger complete graph has smaller conflict risks than two
smaller complete graphs with the same total number of nodes. For
complete graphs of size n1, n2, and n1 + n2 (n1,n2 ≥ 3,n1,n2 ∈ Z),
Tr [Mec (n1)] + Tr [Mec (n2)] > Tr [Mec (n1 + n2)] .
(As long as n1n2−n1−n2−3 ≥ 0, the above inequality holds, which
can be proved using Tr (Mec ) in Table 4.)
Table 5: Dataset summary statistics.
Network Karate Facebook ER BA WS
Nodes 34 4039 n n n
Edges 78 88234 m m1 nK2
Avg degree 4.5882 43.6910 2mn
2m1
n K
Table 6: ACR for random networks of size n = 1000,m ≈ 5000.
ACR ic ec c r
ER 796.6 94.1 15.3 109.3
BA 759.3 109.7 21.2 131.0
WS 804.2 91.2 13.3 104.5
We also showed empirically that for the ec a set of disconnected
components are optimal where each component is either a clique, a
sufficiently long chain, or a tree where each leaf node is separated
by at least two edges from a bifurcation node (see Sec. 5 for details).
5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
5.1 Datasets
We use real social networks as well as synthetic data shown in Ta-
ble 5. The real-world datasets we use are the Karate network with 34
nodes and a Facebook network consisting of 4039 users. The Karate
network is a social network of friendships between 34 members of
a Karate club [33]. The Facebook network contains friend circles
and was collected through the Facebook app surveys [22].
The synthetic data includes three randomnetworkmodels: Erdős-
Rényi (ER) random networks with binomial degree distribution;
Barabási-Albert (BA) random networks with power-law degree dis-
tribution; and Watts-Strogatz (WS) small world random networks.
5.2 Experimental Findings
We investigate the following questions: (1) What types of networks
have the highest risks for what types of conflict measures; (2) What
are the local minima of the ACR for the various measures; (3) For the
external conflict: how do the actual conflict, ACR, and WCR evolve
as the ACR or WCR is being minimized; (4) How do the coordinate
and conditional gradient descent methods compare for the external
conflict. Due to space constraints, some results are summarized,
and details are deferred to a fortcoming extended report. 4
5.2.1 Conflict risk for different measures in random networks. We
investigated how the ACR for different conflict measures compare
to each other across ER, BA, and WS models. We generated random
networks of very similar sizes and densities according to these
models, and we compared their ACR for different conflict measures.
Across a wide range of graph densities, theWS network is consis-
tently themost high-risk for ic , while the BA network is consistently
the most high-risk for ec . For c and r the most high-risk network
depends on the density, although usually the BA or ER networks
carry the highest risk. Table 6 gives an example.
These findings can be interpreted in terms of the properties of
the random network models. In the WS network, the ic is probably
4All code is available at https://bitbucket.org/ghentdatascience/conflictrisk-public
high due to the short path lengths and high clustering coefficient,
which causes opinions to be strongly moderated. In the BA network,
the existence of high-degree hubs along with a fat tail of small-
degree nodes may cause considerable ec between these hubs (which
are strongly moderated) and their surrounding nodes (which are
moderated only by very few nodes).
5.2.2 Empirical study of the local optima of ACR with different
conflict measures. We used the coordinate and conditional gradi-
ent descent methods to optimize the ACR (i.e., Tr (M∗)) until con-
vergence, to investigate the structure of the network at the local
minima. The following findings complement and corroborate the
theoretical analysis of the local minima from the previous section.
Internal Conflict In our experiments, after convergence the net-
work always contains no edges. As in that case internal and
expressed opinions coincide, the ic is then equal to zero, this
is obviously the global minimum.
External Conflict In our experiments, the local minima always
contained sets of disconnected subgraphs that are cliques,
trees, and chains, and sometimes cliques with a chain at-
tached to one of its nodes. Yet, the particular local minimum
found differs for different initial graphs, and also slightly for
the different algorithms and choices of k ′.
Controversy The local minimum found is always the completely
connected graph. While this problem is not known to be
convex, we conjecture that it has only one local minimum.
Resistance We know from theory that this ACR minimization for
resistance is a convex problem. Thus, the minimum found is
always the global minimum, namely the complete graph.
Clearly the ec , which is arguably the most relevant among the con-
flict measures in practice, also exhibits the most complex behavior.
One example of how the network changes when minimizing the ec
is shown in Fig. 2, where the bottom network is the local minimum
for the network on the top. Typical adjustments during both the
coordinate descent and the conditional gradient algorithm are: a
chain of three nodes always forms a triangle (see node 25, 48, 50);
two nodes at the same end of a chain/tree will always be connected
(see node 14, 27); connections that are not strong enough will break
(see node 36 between node 12 and 15).
Remark 2. Interestingly, the structures at the local optima of the
ACR for ec seem to correspond with common management structures
in companies: a flat organization corresponds to a clique, while a
hierarchical organization corresponds to a tree. Management practice
may well have evolved this way in part because it minimizes conflict.
In the sequel, for conciseness we focus on the ec alone, as this is
arguably the most useful and most interesting measure.
5.2.3 Effectiveness of minimizing ACR versus WCR for ec . Here
we investigate the effectiveness of both ACR andWCR. In particular,
we investigated on one ER network and the Karate network how
the ACR, WCR, and the conflict for three different internal opinion
vectors, evolved over consecutive iterations. The three fixed opinion
vectors include a random vector s1, and two vectors found as sign(v)
where v is an eigenvector of the Laplacian: the 10th smallest (i.e.
low-frequency on the graph, s2) as well as the n − 10th (i.e. high-
frequency on the graph, s3).
Figure 2: Optimization of the ACR of ec on an ER network
(n = 50,p = 0.03) with gradient descent (k ′ = 2).
Figure 3 shows that the optimization for ACRwill not necessarily
improve the WCR, and also does not improve the ec for the low-
frequency vector s2, while the optimization over the WCR always
decreases also the ACR and the risks for all three given opinion
vectors. The fact that the WCR is an upper bound for the ACR
as well as for the conflict for any given internal opinion vector
probably explains this. Yet, it is remarkable that minimizing the
more robust measure WCR does not seem to reduce much the rate
at which also the ACR reduces.
5.2.4 How does the performance of conditional gradient descent
compare to that of coordinate descent? The following experiment il-
lustrates our observation that conditional gradient descent typically
converges to a better local minimum than coordinate descent. This
may be because conditional gradient descent can make larger steps
at each iteration, thus allowing it to escape bad local minima more
easily. Figure 4 shows an example of their different performances,
which is consistent with our theoretical conclusion in Sec. 4 about
local optima structures, i.e., larger complete graphs contains less
external conflict ACR than smaller ones adding to the same size.
5.2.5 Real-world networks. For space reasons, a detailed analysis
of real-world networks is postponed to an extended report, but we
summarize the main findings here. The ACR for the Karate network
is minimized by forming a complete network for ec , c and r , and
the network without edge for ic . Connections within the ‘friend
circles’ in the Facebook network are found to be strengthened when
minimizing the ec ACR, while those between circles are gradually
deleted: the originally connected network is ultimately divided into
several connected components as the optimization continues. It
takes 3 to 5 seconds for one coordinate step on Facebook dataset at
Figure 3: TheACR,WCR, and conflict for the three described
internal opinion vectors over consecutive iterations. (a), (b)
are based on an ER model (n = 50,m = 60) with gradient
descent k ′ = 1; (c), (d) on Karate with coordinate descent.
Figure 4: Optimal results using the two algorithms. (a) is the
original graph; (b) is the result of coordinate descent; (c) is
the result of gradient descent with k ′ = 5 at each iteration;
(d) is the result of gradient descent with k ′ = 25.
the beginning and the time increases as edges are added, which is
acceptable in practice.
6 RELATEDWORK
Social network analysis research almost invariably relies on data
from online social media and microblogging sites. In particular
Twitter [9, 15, 21, 27] is often the scene of controversial debates.
Notable studies are Conover et al., who performed research on the
retweet and mention networks from Twitter, and differentiated
between the two mechanisms [9], and Garimella et al., who used
conversation graphs obtained from twitter to quantify controversy
for any topic [15]. While online social media expose the users to
various kinds of opinions, the effects of ‘filter bubbles’ and ‘echo
chamber’ have attracted increasing amounts of attention in recent
years [4, 18]: when people only get information that corroborates
their own opinions and communicate only with like-minded people,
there is a risk that society will be increasingly fragmented and
polarized, although there is an ongoing debate about this issue [18].
Research about polarization and controversy has so far mostly
focused on political issues. Morales et al. studied the emergence
of political polarization and quantified its effects by a polarization
index [27]. Akoglu quantified the political polarity of individuals
and political issues by doing classification and ranking tasks [1].
It defines a node classification task on edge-signed (+/-) bipartite
opinion network, then predicts latent political classes of people and
opinion subjects and ranks people and issues.
Opinion formation models are not always used; some prior work
focuses on the underlying structure of the social network, or as-
sumes there are only two groups for ‘pro’ and ‘contra’. Coletto et
al. used only local patterns of user interactions (motifs) [8]. Guerra
et al. focused on the nodes in the community boundaries [21]. Ran-
dom Walk Controversy (RWC) scores are used to quantify contro-
versy in [15] as the difference between the properties of a random
walk ending in different opinion partitions. Amin et al. studied the
problem of identifying and separating polarization using a matrix
factorization based gradient descent algorithm [3].
Different measures have been proposed for quantifying polariza-
tion or controversy. Modularity is regarded as a traditional measure
for polarization [30], but Guerra et al. argue that it is not a good
measure since non-polarized networks may also be divided into
modular communities in [21]. Then they proposed their novel polar-
ization metric P based on boundary nodes and found that polarized
networks tend to have low concentration on high-degree nodes in
the boundary between two communities. The Social Network Dis-
tance (SND) is a distance measure that quantifies the likelihood of
evolution of one snapshot of a social network into another snapshot
under a chosen opinion dynamic model in [2]. To quantify contro-
versy in social networks in any topic domain, a three-step pipeline
is proposed in [15]. It was found that the RWC outperformed many
other controversy measures, including the betweenness, embed-
ding, boundary connectivity, and dipole moment.
A major and increasingly important focus of research is whether
polarization and controversy can be engineered, e.g. by editing the
graph or affecting opinions of a selected set of individuals. In [17],
the edge-recommendation problem is studied based on the endorse-
ment graph, with the goal to reduce the controversy score (namely
the RWC), and the acceptable probability of the recommended edge
is taken into account. The addition of edges is discussed in [6] in
order to reduce the social cost, namely the lack of agreement in
the network, and it is argued as intuitive because the exposure to
opposite opinions can reduce disagreement. The expressed opinion
vector z above is obtained at the Nash Equilibrium in the social
game of opinion formation [6]. Moreover, they firstly studied the
problem of moderating people’s opinions to reduce the polarization.
Based on the same opinion formation dynamics, the promotion
problem called the CAMPAIGN was studied in [19]. It aimed to
promote a product by setting the expressed opinions of k nodes
to 1 such that the overall opinions д (z) over the network can be
maximized. The expressed opinion zi represents the affection of
node i for the product, and it lies in the range from 0 to 1. This work
provides a good example of shifting from the problem of measuring
opinion differences to the area of influence maximization.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHERWORK
Research into the formation of conflict, disagreement, and related
concepts was until recently the subject of the social sciences only.
Today however, the fact that opinion formation takes place increas-
ingly on online social platforms creates new possibilities to address
related issues from a computer science perspective, building on
models of opinion formation from the social sciences. Specifically,
it creates the potential to quantify, mitigate, and reduce conflict and
disagreement. Prior research on this topic has focused on a single
issue of controversy, and the reduction of conflict on this issue, in
particular by manipulating the structure of the network.
In this paper we included a small survey of existing measures,
and identified an insightful identity between them that amounts to a
conservation law of conflict. However, we also argued that reducing
one of these measures of conflict for a single issue is problematic,
reducing conflict on a single issue may increase it for another.
Indeed, in practice a network is not tied to a single issue, and
even when it is, the individual opinions may be hard to gauge. To
resolve this, we take a novel perspective on this problem, focusing
on identifying a limited number of edges to add or remove in the
network so as to reduce the risk of conflict, both on average and in
the worst-case over all possible opinions.We have demonstrated the
usefulness of these characterizations of conflict risk, studied their
behavior in a range of networks, developed effective algorithms for
optimizing them, and confirmed that their minimization minimizes
actual risk on some random opinion assignments.
In further work, we plan to investigate further the theoretical
properties of these measures, in particular of the worst-case risk.
Additionally, we plan to improve our implementations and investi-
gate other algorithmic improvements for enhanced scalability.
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